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PROMOTING PROGRESS WITH FAIR USE 
JOSHUA N. MITCHELL† 
ABSTRACT 
  The Intellectual Property (IP) Clause provides that Congress has 
the power “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” In the realm of 
copyright, Congress and the courts have interpreted the clause as 
granting Congress a power not to promote progress but to establish 
limited IP monopolies. To return to an understanding of the IP power 
better grounded in the constitutional text, Congress and the courts 
should ensure that any IP enactment “promote[s] . . . Progress” by 
considering whether it improves the quality or quantity of knowledge 
and aids the dissemination of knowledge, and whether it does so 
better than prior IP enactments. The courts can exercise the fair-use 
doctrine to aid in this re-constitutionalization of IP law by applying a 
fifth fair-use factor. This proposed fifth factor would balance the 
progress-promoting value of the alleged infringer’s use against the 
progress-promoting value of enforcing the copyright holder’s rights. 
Reviewing courts should presume that any alleged infringement is fair 
if it promotes progress better than the enforcement of the copyright. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property (IP) law in the United States is off course 
and headed onto the shoals of ever-increasing protectionism. 
Copyright law, in particular, has been commandeered by a process of 
industry-sponsored expansion in which Congress and the courts 
reviewing its legislation have acquiesced. The last forty years have 
seen the copyright term increase, from a modest twenty-eight years, 
to the life of the author plus seventy years.1 Increases in statutory 
damages for copyright infringement, which can be assessed without 
proving actual damages, have left peer-to-peer file sharers potentially 
liable for multimillion-dollar judgments.2 A Congress that can agree 
on little else sheathes its daggers and finds bipartisan agreement over 
the prospect of toughening peripheral restrictions on the online use of 
copyrighted material—granting the government unprecedented 
censorship powers over the worldwide web along the way.3  
In sum, copyright law has come uncoupled from its 
constitutionally defined purpose. A tightly circumscribed right 
intended to incentivize creativity and the spread of knowledge has 
instead become an ever-expanding monopoly over creative works and 
the means by which those works are disseminated. Industries that rely 
on IP control4 increasingly resort to legislation and litigation instead 
of innovation in their efforts to protect existing revenue streams and 
to maintain long-term control over new creations.5 And these 
 
 1. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (“The copyright secured by this title shall endure for 
twenty-eight years from the date of first publication . . . .”), with 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006) 
(“Copyright . . . subsists from [a work’s] creation and . . . endures for a term consisting of the life 
of the author and 70 years after the author’s death.”). 
 2. E.g., Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1048–49 (D. Minn. 
2010) (considering a total jury verdict of approximately $2 million—$80,000 per infringed sound 
recording—which the court labeled “monstrous and shocking”); cf. Prioritizing Resources and 
Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, § 104, 122 Stat. 4256, 
4259 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (Supp. II 2008)) (increasing civil and criminal 
penalties for trademark infringement). 
 3. “[T]he Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously approved [the Combating Online 
Infringement and Counterfeits Act, which] . . . . is among the most draconian laws ever 
considered to combat digital piracy.” Sam Gustin, Web Censorship Bill Sails Through Senate 
Committee, WIRED (Nov. 18, 2010, 2:50 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/11/coica-
web-censorship-bill. 
 4. Copyright industries are largely centered around entertainment—movie, music, 
television, and software. Patent industries include technology producers of every stripe. 
 5. See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 24 (2009) 
(“Litigation has become the tool by which the copyright industries deceive themselves into 
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copyright industries have, in the latter part of the twentieth century 
and the first decade of the twenty-first, found willing allies in the 
courts6 and in Congress,7 over whose eyes the copyright industries 
have become adept at pulling wool. 
This Note offers a new weapon8 to combat these overreaching 
(IP) enactments in Congress and their acceptance in the courts. 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8—the IP Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution—grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”9 Both Congress and the courts have begun to follow a 
faulty but increasingly common interpretation of the grant of power 
to Congress in that clause. Congress and the courts have lost sight of 
the requirement that IP enactments “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts.”10 Although Congress appears unlikely to address 
this problem,11 the courts could take a step toward doing so by adding 
 
thinking they can avoid the inevitable stagnation that occurs when they fail to focus on the 
essential purpose of their business as a ‘customer-creating and customer-satisfying organism.’”). 
 6. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (calling the extra twenty years granted 
by the Copyright Term Extension Act a “rational” and therefore constitutional exercise of 
congressional power); PATRY, supra note 5, at 62–63 (“A brief presented to the Supreme Court 
in the Eldred case by 12 economists . . . demonstrated that the extra 20 years [granted by the 
Copyright Term Extension Act] was simply a windfall to copyright owners, a redistribution of 
money from consumers to copyright owners, and will result in far fewer derivative works being 
created as the cost of clearing rights to use works that would otherwise be in the public domain 
is prohibitive.”). 
 7. PATRY, supra note 5, at 161 (“In 1998, the [Motion Picture Association of America] 
and the [Recording Industry Association of America] successfully lobbied Congress for 
powerful new rights in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)[, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 
112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.)] . . . .”). 
 8. Other commentators have urged limitations to IP enactments based, for example, on 
the First Amendment. See DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 305 (2009) 
(urging “that the First Amendment be read absolutely, in keeping with its first and most obvious 
meaning: that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or of the press by 
conferring monopolies in expression that otherwise would belong to the universe of discourses in 
which all are free to share and share alike” (emphasis in original)). 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress derives its power to enact copyright and patent 
statutes from this clause. 
 10. Id. 
 11. When it considers IP at all, Congress generally attempts to expand it. See, e.g., 
Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act, S. 3804, 111th Cong. (2010) (expanding 
protection of copyrighted works by, for example, authorizing the Attorney General to 
“commence an in rem action against” a website if copyright infringement is “central to the 
activity” of the website). 
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a fifth factor to the familiar and flexible fair-use test12—a factor that 
specifically asks whether the use of a copyrighted work “promote[s] 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts”13 better than the protection 
of the original author’s rights. 
Part I discusses the courts’ and Congress’s modern tendency to 
incorrectly read the IP Clause as a grant of monopoly-awarding 
power. Part II argues for a reading of the IP Clause that would 
necessarily limit Congress’s power to enact IP laws by construing 
“promot[ion]” to require an improvement over the current state of 
legislation, and “Progress” to require both qualitative advancement 
of knowledge and encouragement to the dissemination of copyrighted 
works. Part III suggests a potential ameliorative step to the problems 
described in the previous Parts: the judicial application of a fifth fair-
use factor explicitly comparing the progress-promoting value of the 
allegedly infringing work with that of the underlying work. This 
proposal, if put into effect, would have a destabilizing effect on 
copyright holders’ rights, but it would move copyright policy back 
toward its constitutional foundation. 
I.  INTERPRETING THE IP CLAUSE 
The IP Clause grants Congress the power to make laws providing 
exclusive rights to authors and inventors. This power conflicts with 
the restrictions placed on Congress by the First Amendment. 
Consistency with these restrictions requires a narrow, circumscribed 
reading of the IP Clause. Fortunately, the text of the clause already 
provides appropriate limitations—if only Congress and the courts 
could be convinced to take them seriously. 
A.  The Plain Meaning of the IP Clause 
Copyright in the United States is a “creature of statute.”14 At its 
root, then, it is a creature of the Constitution, for it is an axiom of 
constitutional law that Congress may only legislate pursuant to one of 
 
 12. The fair use of a copyrighted work is not an infringement on the copyright. Courts 
determine whether a use is fair by applying a nonexclusive list of four factors. 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2006). For further discussion of the fair-use test, see infra notes 124–33 and accompanying text. 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 14. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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its constitutionally enumerated powers.15 Those affirmative legislative 
powers reside in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, a section that 
comprises a single sentence with a series of grammatically parallel 
infinitive phrases,16 each granting Congress a specific power or cluster 
of powers.17 
Unlike the other clauses in Section 8—which consist of simple 
grants (“[t]o provide and maintain a Navy”18), complex grants (“[t]o 
declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules 
concerning Captures on Land and Water”19), or grants with express 
limitations (“[t]o raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of 
Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years”20)—the 
IP Clause’s structure is mildly ambiguous. This has resulted in 
legislative and judicial hand-wringing over what, exactly, the IP 
Clause empowers Congress to do. 
The IP Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”21 The best reading of this clause interprets 
the phrase “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” as 
the clause’s grant of power, with the remainder of the clause serving 
as an internally limited means by which Congress may exercise that 
grant. Other readings of the clause—those that, for example, treat the 
grant of power as mere preamble22—fail to protect important free 
 
 15. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 323 (1819) (“Congress, by the 
constitution, is invested with certain powers; and, as to the objects, and within the scope of these 
powers, it is sovereign.” (emphasis added)). 
 16. Edward C. Walterscheid, The Preambular Argument: The Dubious Premise of Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 44 IDEA 331, 346 (2004). Although the grants in Article I, Section 8 are—strictly 
speaking—phrases rather than clauses, the legal convention is to refer to them as “clauses.” This 
Note will follow that convention. 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 346 (“Article I, Section 8 
enumerates the powers granted to Congress in eighteen separate clauses of which the Science 
and Useful Arts Clause is the eighth. These clauses exhibit a remarkably uniform and parallel 
grammatical structure. They consist of a series of infinitive verb forms, declaring the specific 
powers given to Congress. In each instance, the infinitive verb form is the legally operative grant 
of power.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. 
 19. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 20. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 21. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 22. E.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211–12 (2003). 
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speech interests, including the development of a healthy and growing 
public domain.23 
The IP Clause’s structure comprises two elements: the progress-
promoting clause (“[t]o promote the Progress of Science24 and useful 
Arts”25) and the monopoly-granting26 clause (“by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries”27). The most natural, plain-
language reading of the IP Clause is that the progress-promoting 
clause, like each of the other seventeen infinitive clauses in Article I, 
Section 8, grants power: “[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”28 In the words of 
 
 23. Recognition of the public domain as an affirmative entity, worthy of protection in its 
own right, largely began with David Lange’s seminal 1981 essay, Recognizing the Public 
Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Autumn 1981). See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 294 (2008) (describing Lange’s essay as 
“[t]he foundational essay” regarding “[t]he specific concern with the public domain”). The 
values underlying the public domain, however, are intertwined both with the right of free speech 
and the uncontroversial notion that creativity in general requires the use of others’ work as a 
starting point. See id. at 122–24 (discussing the different ways in which works covered by patent 
and copyright build on works already in existence). 
 24. The Framers’ understanding of “Science” was broader than the commonly accepted 
modern meaning of the term: it encompassed all forms of knowledge acquired by study or 
training, including, for example, philosophy and literature. See, e.g., 14 THE OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 648 (2d ed. 1989) (defining science as “[k]nowledge acquired by study; 
acquaintance with or mastery of any department of learning,” with this usage current for several 
centuries through 1781). 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 26. This Note uses the term “monopoly-granting” as shorthand while acknowledging its 
shortcomings as a description of what the IP Clause purports to do. The clause gives Congress 
the power to grant authors and inventors exclusive economic rights over their creations—in 
effect, making those authors and inventors monopolists over their “Writings and Discoveries.” 
But unlike the traditional conception of the unregulated, unfettered commercial monopoly, the 
copyright and patent monopolies granted pursuant to the IP Clause are limited in both duration 
and scope, under the express terms of the clause itself. 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 28. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text. Professor Lawrence 
Lessig is a proponent of this view: 
[T]his clause is unique within the power-granting clause of Article I, section 8 of our 
Constitution. Every other clause granting power to Congress simply says Congress 
has the power to do something—for example, to regulate “commerce among the 
several states” or “declare War.” But here, the “something” is something quite 
specific—to “promote . . . Progress”—through means that are also specific—by 
“securing” “exclusive Rights” (i.e., copyrights [and patents]) “for limited Times.” 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO 
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 215 (2004) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8). Indeed, it formed an integral part of his argument for the petitioners in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186 (2003). Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 10, Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (2002) (No. 01-
618). 
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Professor Lawrence Lessig, “Like every other power in Article I, sec. 
8, ‘to promote the Progress of Science’ is the [grammatical] object of 
‘Congress has the power . . . .’ Removing that object renders the 
clause meaningless: ‘Congress has the power . . . by securing for 
limited Times to Authors the exclusive Right to their Writings.’”29 
Had the Framers desired to grant a different power, the other 
seventeen clauses in Article I, Section 8 are compelling evidence that 
they could have done so. Nothing prevented them from wording the 
clause to give Congress the power, for example, to secure for limited 
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their writings and 
inventions, in order to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts. They might even have said simply that “Congress shall have the 
power to grant patents and copyrights.”30 But that is not the language 
the Framers chose. 
If the progress-promoting clause is correctly viewed as the IP 
Clause’s grant of power, the monopoly-granting clause should then be 
viewed as the means by which Congress may exercise that grant of 
power.31 The Framers and those of their generation reasoned that 
monopolies are generally an evil.32 But in this one situation, properly 
limited, they provide a desirable outcome that an unfettered market 
in IP would otherwise fail to generate. Without legal protection, 
authors and inventors, protective of their revenues, might be inclined 
to seek nondisclosing solutions.33 The grant of a period of exclusivity 
to authors and inventors promotes the release of their creations to the 
public, increasing the general storehouse of knowledge. 
 
 29. Reply Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 28, at 10. 
 30. Jessica Talati, Comment, Copyrighting Stage Directions & the Constitutional Mandate 
to “Promote the Progress of Science,” 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 241, 250 (2009). 
 31. See supra note 28. 
 32. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966) (“Jefferson, like other Americans, 
had an instinctive aversion to monopolies. It was a monopoly on tea that sparked the 
Revolution and Jefferson certainly did not favor an equivalent form of monopoly under the new 
government.”). 
 33. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 23, at 251 (“[I]ntellectual property rights, like property 
rights in general, have a role after the innovation has occurred—facilitating its efficient 
exploitation, allowing inventors to disclose their inventions to prospective licensees without 
thereby losing control of them, and providing a state-constructed, neatly tied bundle of 
entitlements that can be efficiently traded in the market.”). 
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If Congress’s IP power extends only as far as the boundaries of 
the explicit grant in the IP Clause, and if the monopoly-granting 
clause is to be read as the required means of implementing that 
power, then that clause must also necessarily impose a limit on 
Congress’s progress-promoting power.34 Congress cannot, for 
example, grant an author or inventor an exclusive right for an 
unlimited time.35 An important goal of the IP clause is the eventual 
release of works into the public domain, where they may serve as 
building blocks for future creativity. An unlimited monopoly would 
prevent works from reaching that goal.36 
Determining the exact shape of the limitation this reading 
imposes on Congress’s progress-promoting power, however, requires 
more than mere parsing. Here, there are two possible readings: first, 
that the monopoly-granting clause as a whole limits the progress-
promoting power, or, second, that the clause contains a cluster of 
discrete limitations on the explicit means for exercising that power.37 
 
 34. See John Deere, 383 U.S. at 5 (“The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation.”). 
But see infra note 37. 
 35. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“But the 
requirement that [patent and copyright] grants be for ‘limited Times’ serves the ultimate 
purpose of promoting the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’ by guaranteeing that those 
innovations will enter the public domain as soon as the period of exclusivity expires.” (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)). 
 36. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 23, at 11 (“[T]he goal of the system ought to be to give the 
monopoly only for as long as necessary to provide an incentive. After that, we should let the 
work fall into the public domain where all of us can use it, transform it, adapt it, build on it, 
republish it as we wish.”). 
 37. Legal historian Edward Walterscheid advances a third possibility: that the monopoly-
granting clause is “an explanation of, rather than a limitation on” the progress-promoting 
clause. Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 356. Although this reading purports to harmonize two 
Supreme Court readings of the clause, its defect is that it appears to require reading an 
additional word, “including,” into the constitutional text. Id. at 357 (arguing that the clause 
should be interpreted to read, “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, [including] by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their Respective Writings and Discoveries” (alterations in original)). 
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1. One View of the Monopoly-Granting Clause: Limiting in its 
Entirety.  One could view the monopoly-granting clause as a limit on 
the progress-promoting clause as a whole: that is, Congress has the 
power to promote progress, but may do so only by means of granting 
limited monopolies to authors and inventors.38 
This reading is unsatisfactory. The primary and most convincing 
of the reasons for this is that the promotion of the “Progress of 
Science and useful Arts” is a policy the Framers presumably would 
have wanted Congress to pursue even if by means other than those it 
prescribed in this single clause, so long as those means were within 
the scope of one of Congress’s other affirmative powers.39 The IP 
Clause’s placement with Congress’s other affirmative powers in 
Article I, Section 8 is an indication that the clause should be read to 
increase those powers.40 The Constitution places limits on Congress’s 
enumerated powers in Article I, Section 9. For example, although 
Section 8 grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States,”41 its regulation cannot include taxation of 
“Articles exported from any State.”42 Thus, a reading of the IP Clause 
that places a significant limit on one of Congress’s other enumerated 
powers in order to achieve the clause’s grant is inconsistent with its 




 38. See id. at 355 (“[B]oth the Supreme Court and [the Federal Circuit’s] own predecessor 
court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals . . . had earlier used language suggesting that 
promotion of the useful arts could in fact only occur through the patent and copyright 
systems.”). 
 39. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, 
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and 
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”); Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 351 (“[A] wide 
variety of other means than patents and copyrights were known for promoting the progress of 
science and useful arts. Little in the contemporaneous record points to any reason why the 
Framers would desire to preclude Congress from authority to use a wide variety of means to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts.” (footnote omitted)); see also Walterscheid, 
supra note 16, at 352 (“[W]hile congressional authority to spend public monies is not absolute 
[under the General Welfare Clause], neither is it limited to the direct grants of legislative 
authority found in the Constitution.”). 
 40. Cf. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 419–20 (“The [‘necessary and proper’] clause is 
placed among the powers of Congress, not among the limitations on those powers. . . . Its terms 
purport to enlarge, not to diminish the powers vested in the government. It purports to be an 
additional power, not a restriction on those already granted.”). 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 42. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. 
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In other words, the limiting-as-a-whole reading would secure the 
dark-gray area in Figure 1 by sacrificing the light-gray area; the better 
reading, as discussed below, is that the IP Clause grants the dark-gray 
area in addition to the light-gray area. 











2. A Better View of the Monopoly-Granting Clause: A Cluster of 
Discrete Limitations on the Exercise of the Enumerated Means.  
Another possible view of the limit imposed by the monopoly-granting 
clause is that it places a cluster of discrete limitations on the exercise 
of the monopoly-granting means for exercising the progress-
promoting power. In other words, if Congress wants to exercise its 
progress-promoting power using the monopoly-granting means—if it 
wishes to legislate in the dark-gray area in Figure 1—it must comply 
with a series of limitations such as the following:43 
 
1. Congress may only secure copyright- and patent-style 
rights over “Writings and Discoveries.” 44 
2. Congress may only secure copyright- and patent-style 
rights to “Authors and Inventors.” 45 
 
 43. This list is not meant to be exhaustive; other limitations are imposed by, for example, 
the definition of “securing” and “exclusive Right.” See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the 
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” 
(emphases added)). 
 44. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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3. The grant of exclusive rights on a particular writing or 
discovery may go only to the author or inventor 
responsible for its creation. 46 
4. Congress may only grant these rights for “limited 
Times.” 47 
 
This reading gives effect to the IP Clause’s limitations while avoiding 
the undesirable elimination of progress-promoting activities that fall 
squarely within another of Congress’s enumerated powers. Further, it 
hews more closely than does the earlier reading both to the plain 
meaning of the text and to the clause’s placement with Congress’s 
other affirmative powers in Article I, Section 8. 
This second reading is not without problems, the primary one 
being that distinguishing exercises of the monopoly-granting power 
from exercises of other congressional powers is not always a simple 
task. Making the distinction is necessary, however, because Congress 
must determine whether it needs to comply with the restrictions in 
the IP Clause or with those of some other clause. Trademark, for 
example, is a monopoly grant of a type similar to those granted under 
the IP Clause, but the Supreme Court rightly held that trademark law 
is not a valid exercise of that clause because “it [does not] depend 
upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain. It 
requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. It 
is simply founded on priority of appropriation.”48 Further, the 
purpose of trademark law is to avoid unfair competition, not to 
promote progress. Federal trademark law is therefore an enactment 
under the Commerce Clause rather than the IP Clause, and the 
restrictions on Congress’s power to enact trademark law are those of 
the Commerce Clause, not of the IP Clause. 
 
 45. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 46. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (securing “the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries” (emphasis added)). 
 47. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 48. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). The Court went on to hold that the 
trademark law as then enacted reached too far into intrastate commerce to be a valid exercise of 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power. Id. at 96–97. Congress therefore made certain to delineate 
the limits of trademark protection in its subsequent trademark enactments. E.g., Act of Feb. 20, 
1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, repealed by Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (allowing 
registration of a trademark “used in commerce with foreign nations, or among the several 
States, or with Indian tribes”). 
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The universe of congressional enactments that lie on or near the 
line between monopoly-granting enactments and enactments under 
other congressional powers, however, is sufficiently small that any 
uncertainty in this area is likely to be viewed as a reasonable tradeoff 
as against other, more or less restrictive readings of the IP Clause. 
Core IP rights like those granted by the current patent49 and copyright 
statutes50 are clearly “exclusive Right[s]” in “Writings and 
Discoveries” being granted to “Authors and Inventors” for “limited 
Times.” Only when Congress seeks to expand these rights do 
problems arise.51 
B.  Recent Interpretations of the IP Clause 
Despite the text’s limitations, Congress has largely ignored the 
limits of its IP Clause power.52 In part, this is because courts have, 
either explicitly or implicitly, been reluctant to rein in Congress’s 
more egregious excesses in this domain. This Section discusses the 
courts’ responses first, then turns to Congress’s. 
1. Courts.  Although the courts traditionally interpreted the 
progress-promoting clause as the grant of power in Article I, Section 
8, Clause 8, the recent trend has been to give the progress-promoting 
clause short shrift.53 This trend culminated in Eldred v. Ashcroft,54 in 
which the Supreme Court dismissed the clause as “preambular 
language.”55 At a minimum, the Eldred Court may be described as 
receptive to the argument that the clause “places no substantive limit 
on Congress’ legislative power,” at least in the context of copyright.56 
 
 49. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006). 
 50. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006). 
 51. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (reasoning that further First 
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary because the Copyright Term Extension Act does not alter 
the “traditional contours” of copyright (Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 
No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.)). 
 52. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 53. See Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 332–33 (“The traditional view, which has been 
voiced since the Constitution was ratified, is that the grant of power resides in the phrase ‘To 
promote the progress of Science and useful Arts’ . . . . An entirely different interpretation began 
to come into vogue in the second half of the twentieth century. According to this view, the ‘to 
promote’ language is merely a preamble which sets forth only a statement of purpose.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 54. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 55. Id. at 211. 
 56. Id. at 197. Here, the Court is referring without demur to the petitioners’ 
“acknowledgment” regarding the “preamble.” Id. Whether the petitioners were 
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In Eldred, seven Justices voted to uphold the constitutionality57 of the 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA),58 which 
extended the term of existing copyrights by twenty years, from life-of-
the-author-plus-fifty-years to life-of-the-author-plus-seventy-years.59 
The Court’s analysis of the extent of Congress’s power under the IP 
Clause focuses almost exclusively on the “limited Times” language of 
the monopoly-granting clause, ignoring the issue of whether the 
CTEA promotes progress.60 
Instead of reading the progress-promoting clause as a grant of 
power, the Court read it as the “end”61 or the “objective”62 to which 
Congress may legislate. This reading allowed the Court to avoid 
closely considering whether the CTEA actually promotes progress 
and instead to skip directly to a rational basis review of the CTEA, 
focusing on the “limited Times” language of the IP Clause—a review 
the Court performed with the usual extreme deference to Congress.63 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court concluded that the CTEA 
was a “rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the 
[IP] Clause”64 without once stating what that legislative authority 
might be. 
The Court concluded that, by enacting the CTEA, Congress had 
effectuated “the ends of the Clause”65 and “the constitutional aim.”66 
 
“acknowledg[ing]” any such thing is not so cut-and-dried as the Court makes it sound, however. 
See Reply Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 28, at 10–11 (arguing that the “grant of power”—
that is, the progress-promoting clause—has “[i]nterpretive [e]ffect”). 
 57. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222. Justices Stevens and Breyer dissented. Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); id. at 242 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, at least, appears to have had the 
limitations imposed by the progress-promoting clause in mind. See id. at 223 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 58. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 59. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193. 
 60. Id. at 200–01. 
 61. Id. at 211. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 200 (“To comprehend the scope of Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause, 
‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic.’ History reveals an unbroken congressional 
practice of granting to authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of term 
extensions . . . . Since then, Congress has regularly applied duration extensions to both existing 
and future copyrights.” (citation omitted) (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 
(1921))). Justice Breyer argued forcefully in dissent that, even under this permissive standard, 
the CTEA does not pass muster. Id. at 266–67 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. at 204–06 (majority opinion). 
 65. Id. at 222. 
 66. Id. (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). 
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Even assuming that this “ends” and “aim” language refers to the 
progress-promoting clause,67 the Court here failed to accord that 
clause its correct weight: the clause is not merely the “ends,” an 
“aim,” or an “objective;”68 it is rather the grant of power itself.69 
Congress may come up short of its ends, miss its aim, or fail to secure 
its objective. It may not exceed its power. 
Echoes of Eldred can be found in District of Columbia v. Heller,70 
in which the Court described the “prefatory clause” of the Second 
Amendment as merely “announc[ing] a purpose” for the 
Amendment’s “operative clause.”71 The two situations, however, are 
not analogous. The structure of the IP Clause is not like that of the 
Second Amendment, which reads, “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”72 Extraneous commas 
notwithstanding, the Court’s reading of the Second Amendment is 
convincing: a main clause (“the right of the people to keep and bear 
arms[] shall not be infringed”) with a purposive, preambular 
subordinate clause (“[a] well regulated militia[] being necessary to the 
security of a free state”). The prevailing reading of the IP Clause, by 
contrast, would turn what is grammatically the main clause into a 
preamble and the subordinate clause into the operative one. Worse, 
this judicial act of constitutional editing defies the often-announced 
canon of construction that an unambiguous statement means what it 
says on its face.73 
One commentator has viewed the Eldred Court’s treatment of 
the progress-promoting clause as the latest, regrettable stage in what 
is only a fairly recent evolution away from the plain meaning of the IP 
 
 67. See id. at 212 (“‘[T]he primary objective of copyright’ is ‘[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science.’ The ‘constitutional command,’ we have recognized, is that Congress, to the extent it 
enacts copyright laws at all, create a ‘system’ that ‘promote[s] the Progress of Science.’” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991))). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See supra Part I.A. 
 70. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 71. Id. at 2789; see also id. (“That requirement of logical connection may cause a prefatory 
clause to resolve an ambiguity in the operative clause . . . . But apart from that clarifying 
function, a prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.”). 
 72. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 73. E.g., Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (“When we find the terms of a 
statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except in ‘rare and exceptional 
circumstances.’” (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978))). 
MITCHELL IN PRINTER PROOF 3/30/2011  12:01:21 PM 
2011] PROMOTING PROGRESS WITH FAIR USE 1653 
Clause’s text.74 But it is not clear that the Court has, at least in recent 
memory, applied the more stringent view of the IP Clause when 
discussing copyright. The Supreme Court’s reading of the clause in 
the context of patent, however, hews closer to the text. In the patent 
case Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,75 the Court recognized 
the progress-promoting clause as a hard limit on the exercise of 
congressional power: “The [IP] clause is both a grant of power and a 
limitation. This qualified authority . . . is limited to the promotion of 
advances in the ‘useful arts.’ . . . The Congress in the exercise of the 
patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated 
constitutional purpose.”76 In treating the progress-promoting clause as 
a restraint that Congress may not overreach, the Court more closely 
approached the spirit of the IP Clause, if not its actual force.77 Six 
years later, in the 1972 patent case Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp.,78 the Court stated simply that “[t]he direction of Art. I is that 
Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of science and 
the useful arts.”79 These statements are a far cry from the Eldred 
Court’s avoidance of the subject two decades later. 
It is unclear how much weight the Court gives to its patent 
jurisprudence when considering copyright. But in Eldred, the Court 
looked beyond its own recent patent-related holdings and focused on 
congressional history: “[b]ecause the Clause empowering Congress to 
confer copyrights also authorizes patents, congressional practice with 
respect to patents informs our inquiry.”80 Although none of this is 
conclusive, the case law suggests that Supreme Court jurisprudence 
interpreting the IP Clause with regard to copyright is now on a 
separate track from that interpreting the same clause with regard to 
patent. 
Lower courts have scarcely been any friendlier to a plain-
language reading of the IP Clause. For example, before Eldred 
 
 74. See Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 332–33 (“An entirely different interpretation began 
to come into vogue in the second half of the twentieth century. According to this view, the ‘to 
promote’ language is merely a preamble which sets forth only a statement of purpose.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 75. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 76. Id. at 5–6. 
 77. For the argument that even this conception of Congress’s power is insufficient to meet 
constitutional requirements, see infra Part II. 
 78. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972). 
 79. Id. at 530. 
 80. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 201 (2003). 
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reached the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit ruled against the Eldred 
petitioners in Eldred v. Reno81 and went even further than the 
Supreme Court, affirmatively calling the progress-promoting clause a 
“preambular statement of purpose[]”82 and drawing a distinction 
between it and the “substantive grant of power.”83 
Courts at least have the excuse that they must in general look to 
the arguments presented by the parties in the matters before them. 
Congress faces no such limitations and boasts far-reaching factfinding 
powers; yet its enactments lie at the root of the overreaching that 
characterizes the current state of U.S. IP law. 
2. Congress.  In other areas, Congress has demonstrated that it 
knows how to impose proper limits on its legislation. For example, 
the language of the federal kidnapping statute,84 enacted in part 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause,85 provides in relevant part that 
[w]hoever unlawfully seizes . . . and holds for ransom or reward or 
otherwise any person, . . . when . . . the person is willfully transported 
in interstate or foreign commerce, . . . or the offender travels in 
interstate or foreign commerce or uses . . . any means, facility, or 
instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in committing or in 
furtherance of the commission of the offense . . . shall be punished 
by imprisonment for any term of years or for life . . . .86 
Congress here uses explicit and specific language to avoid legislating 
beyond that clause’s bounds, using “interstate or foreign commerce” 
as a limiting factor three distinct times in the course of a single 
sentence.87 
 
 81. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 82. Id. at 377. 
 83. Id. at 378 (“[A]lthough the plaintiffs claim that Feist supports using the preamble to 
interpret the rest of the Clause, the Court in Feist never suggests that the preamble informs its 
interpretation of the substantive grant of power to the Congress (which there turned upon the 
meaning of ‘Authors’ and of ‘Writings,’ each standing alone).” (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–47 (1991))). But see id. at 381 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) 
(“That clause empowers the Congress to do one thing, and one thing only. That one thing is ‘to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts.’ . . . The clause is not an open grant of power to 
secure exclusive rights. It is a grant of a power to promote progress.”). 
 84. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
 85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 86. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (emphasis added). 
 87. Id. 
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Similarly, the first Congress included limiting language in the 
Copyright Act of 1790,88 which extended to “maps, charts, and books” 
and was explicitly an “Act for the encouragement of learning.”89 But 
Congress’s intent in passing the Copyright Act of 197690 appears much 
different. Although Congress passed the Act pursuant to the IP 
Clause, any limitations are seemingly absent. Instead, the law begins 
with a statement that the limited copyright monopoly “subsists, in 
accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from 
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.”91 This Act conspicuously lacks any requirement that the 
“original work[] of authorship”92 “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts,”93 or even that the statute be interpreted with 
Congress’s progress-promoting power in mind. Indeed, there is no 
indication anywhere in the statute’s language that Congress has 
considered itself limited by its stated grant of power. 
3. A Principled View?  If the trend has been to treat the IP 
Clause simply as a monopoly-granting clause with some meaningless 
surplusage tacked onto its front, surely those adhering to this 
interpretation have reasons for doing so. One possible reason for the 
courts’ behavior is that, by and large, they limit themselves to ruling 
on the arguments presented to them, and even those attorneys who 
advocate these or similar positions in their scholarship are reluctant 
to do so in their briefs and arguments.94 
Congress’s motives—frequently influenced by industry 
lobbying—have not always been faithful to the constitutional text. 
The Congress that passed the CTEA, for example, seems to have 
been motivated in no small part by a few members’ desire to extend 
 
 88. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2006)). 
 91. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 92. Id. 
 93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 94. See, e.g., Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 337 (describing Professor Lessig’s reluctance 
to raise the argument that the progress-promoting clause places an “independent, substantive 
limitation on the power of [C]ongress . . . . because it was unnecessary and seemed to open up 
all sorts of new and unmanageable judicial review” (quoting private communication from 
Lawrence Lessig to author (July 26, 2003))). 
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copyright terms as far as possible without falling afoul of the “limited 
Times” provision.95 Further, Congress has appeared susceptible to 
lobbying pressure from industry groups like the Motion Picture 
Association of America (MPAA) and its music-industry counterpart, 
the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA),96 which 
push for increased—and not obviously progress-promoting—
protections, to the detriment of Congress’s constitutional 
responsibilities.97 
II.  INTERPRETING THE GRANT OF POWER: WHAT DOES IT MEAN 
TO “[P]ROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND USEFUL ARTS”? 
Practices that fall outside the constitutional mandate to promote 
progress are outside of Congress’s power. Without a clear method for 
determining whether a given piece of legislation falls within that 
mandate, however, it would be futile to demand that Congress or the 
courts remain within the IP Clause’s bounds. This Part provides 
a principled means for determining whether a given piece of 
legislation “promote[s] the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” a 
determination that, though difficult, is not impossible. 
A.  What Does “[P]romote the Progress” Mean? 
Because Congress has the power to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts,” it is necessary to parse the words in the 
grant to understand the nature and extent of the limitations those 
words impose. “Science and useful Arts” are broad terms that 
encompass all types of knowledge98 and invention;99 the limitations 
 
 95. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 256 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing to the 
statements of several members of Congress—including those of Representative Sonny Bono 
and his widow, Representative Mary Bono Mack—that urge perpetual copyright terms). 
 96. The MPAA and RIAA regularly spend millions of dollars a year lobbying Congress. 
Bruce Gain, Special Report: Music Industry’s Lavish Lobbying Campaign for Digital Rights, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Jan. 6, 2011, 4:38 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/01/06/
special-report-music-industrys-lavish-lobby-campaign-for-digital-rights; MPAA Spent $520K in 
3Q Lobbying Federal Govt, YAHOO! FIN. (Dec. 16, 2010, 5:11 PM EST), http://finance.yahoo.
com/news/MPAA-spent-520K-in-3Q-apf-813283816.html. 
 97. See supra note 7. 
 98. See supra note 24. 
 99. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefore . . . .”); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1979) (stating 
that patentable subject matter includes “anything under the sun that is made by man” (quoting 
S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952))). 
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imposed by the progress-promoting clause, therefore, must come, if at 
all, from the definitions of “promote” and “Progress.” Based on the 
definitions of those terms, the courts and Congress should determine 
whether a given enactment promotes progress by answering the 
following three questions: 
 
1. Is it reasonable to believe that the law will encourage an 
increase in the quality or quantity of knowledge? 
2. Is it reasonable to believe that the law will encourage the 
dissemination of knowledge? 
3. Is it reasonable to believe that the encouragement this 
law provides either to the increase of knowledge or to the 
dissemination of knowledge will be an improvement over 
the encouragement provided by existing laws? 
 
1. “Progress.”  Several definitions of “Progress” have emerged 
over the past decade. One view sees progress in terms of qualitative 
advancement: the progress of knowledge is promoted by those works 
and activities that increase knowledge both in kind and in amount.100 
A second view, which its adherents claim hews closer to the Framers’ 
understanding of the term, conceives of progress as a physical motion, 
which, in the context of IP, connotes the dissemination or spread of 
knowledge.101 Though based on solid historical and linguistic 
evidence,102 this interpretation is strained because it excludes much of 
what both our generation considers and the Framers’ considered to 
be part of “Progress.”103 Each of these first two views is an attempt to 
provide a principled limit to the discretion vested in Congress under 
the IP Clause by limiting the purposes to which Congress may apply 
its progress-promoting power.104 
 
 100. E.g., Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 374 (“[Progress] meant . . . the idea of 
advancement in science and the useful arts, including through the efforts of writers and 
inventors in creating new writings and finding out new discoveries of a utilitarian 
nature. . . . [T]he Clause was intended to provide an incentive for advances in science and the 
useful arts through encouragement of the intellectual efforts of writers and inventors.”). 
 101. E.g., Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 
80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 755 (2001). 
 102. Id. at 799–809. 
 103. Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 374 (“[O]ne of the dictionary definitions of ‘progress’ at 
the end of the eighteenth century was ‘intellectual improvement; intellectual 
advancement’ . . . .”). 
 104. See infra Part II.A.2. 
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A third position combines the previous two, asserting that 
“Progress” may be either qualitative advancement or dissemination 
of knowledge.105 Additionally, the commentators advancing this 
reading include the preservation of existing works within the concept 
of dissemination.106 Unlike the previous two definitions, this 
disjunctive test does little work; indeed, under it, “it is unclear in what 
manner the ‘to promote’ language actually constrains the copyright 
power of Congress.”107 The inclusion of “encouraging the . . . 
preservation of existing works”108 as an independently sufficient 
condition for a finding that Congress is “promot[ing] the Progress” 
provides few constraints on congressional action. If it limits Congress 
at all, in fact, it does so only by forbidding Congress from actively 
seeking the destruction of existing works in its copyright laws.109 
A better reading is that “Progress” requires both qualitative 
advancement and dissemination.110 A work that advances knowledge 
in some field but is not disseminated cannot be said to have promoted 
 
 105. Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, “To Promote the Progress of Science”: The 
Copyright Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2002). 
 106. See id. at 3 n.10 (advancing the argument that “[copyright-term] extension ‘give[s] 
copyright holders an incentive to preserve older works, particularly motion pictures in need of 
restoration’” and is therefore “‘plainly adapted’ and ‘appropriate’ to ‘promot[ing] progress’” 
(quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378–79 (D.C. Cir. 2001))). 
 107. Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 377. 
 108. Hatch & Lee, supra note 105, at 23. 
 109. As absurd as the idea sounds that Congress might intentionally choose to destroy 
existing works, there is evidence that the CTEA has done exactly that. Before enacting the 
CTEA, Congress heard from film historians that the Act would hinder or prevent the efforts of 
film preservationists to save films that are stored on old film stock. E.g., Letter from Larry 
Urbanski, Chairman, Am. Film Heritage Ass’n, to Sen. Strom Thurmond (Mar. 31, 1997), 
available at http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/letters/AFH.
html. 
 110. Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 244 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The 
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment seek related objectives—the creation and 
dissemination of information.” (emphasis added)); Malla Pollack, Dealing with Old Father 
William, or Moving from Constitutional Text to Constitutional Doctrine: Progress Clause Review 
of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 337, 355–56 (2002) (“[T]he creation 
and dissemination” of “knowledge (‘Science’), technology (‘useful Arts’), writings, and 
discoveries” are “necessary to the continued viability of a republican polity.”); Walterscheid, 
supra note 16, at 376 (suggesting that Pollack’s language, possibly indicating a shift toward 
including “both creation and dissemination,” leaves them “in basic agreement as to the 
interpretation to be given to ‘Progress.’”). But see Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 374 (“I 
suggest that it meant, and was intended to mean, the idea of advancement in science and the 
useful arts, including through the efforts of writers and inventors in creating new writings and 
finding out new discoveries of a utilitarian nature. That is to say, the Clause was intended to 
provide an incentive for advances in science and the useful arts through encouragement of the 
intellectual efforts of writers and inventors.”). 
MITCHELL IN PRINTER PROOF 3/30/2011  12:01:21 PM 
2011] PROMOTING PROGRESS WITH FAIR USE 1659 
progress in any meaningful sense.111 Similarly, a work that is 
disseminated among the masses but that does not expand the 
boundaries of knowledge is not progress promoting. 
Therefore, Congress and the courts should begin by asking, first, 
whether it is reasonable to believe that a copyright enactment under 
consideration will encourage an increase in the quality or quantity of 
knowledge, and, second, whether it is reasonable to believe that the 
law will encourage the dissemination of that knowledge. To find that 
the law promotes progress, the questioner must answer both 
questions in the affirmative.112 
2. “Promote.”  Although a great deal more scholarly attention 
focuses on what “Progress” means,113 the Supreme Court has weighed 
in instead on how to define “promote,” stating that it means “to 
stimulate, to encourage, or to induce.”114 But “promote”—like 
“Progress”—also includes connotations of forward motion or 
advancement.115 
It is consistent with both readings to require that, when Congress 
legislates pursuant to the IP Clause, its legislation must offer some 
 
 111. See Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 497 (1850) (“If the foreign invention had 
been printed or patented, it was already given to the world and open to the people of this 
country, as well as of others, upon reasonable inquiry. They would therefore derive no 
advantage from the invention here. It would confer no benefit upon the community, and the 
inventor therefore is not considered to be entitled to the reward. But if the foreign discovery is 
not patented, nor described in any printed publication, it might be known and used in remote 
places for ages, and the people of this country be unable to profit by it. The means of obtaining 
knowledge would not be within their reach; and, as far as their interest is concerned, it would be 
the same thing as if the improvement had never been discovered.”). 
 112. In this analysis, it is important to separate the law from the work it protects. A law may 
promote progress without requiring that the works it protects push back the boundaries of 
knowledge. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a law that encourages experimentation—and thus 
promotes progress—without offering protection to a wide variety of works. First, the work’s 
author may not be the best judge of the work’s progress-promoting qualities, and, second, those 
qualities may not become apparent until later in the work’s life cycle. See, e.g., Alan Friedman, 
A Sad and Funny Story, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1980, § 7 (book review), at 2 (describing the 
tortured publication history of John Kennedy Toole’s posthumously published novel A 
Confederacy of Dunces). 
 113. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 114. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 115. 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 616. It is also perhaps 
notable that the Framers chose the “to promote” language over language that specifically 
included the term “encourage.” Walterscheid, supra note 16, at 341 (“Madison’s notes indicate 
that among those submitted by him [was] . . . ‘To encourage by premiums & provisions, the 
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.’”). 
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modicum of improvement of the incentives to progress over those 
provided by current legislation. 
A piece of legislation that reduces incentives to progress cannot, 
de facto, be called a promotion of progress. More subtly, a piece of 
legislation that merely keeps to existing levels of encouragement 
cannot be said to “promote . . . Progress” either, but rather merely to 
continue or maintain it. Put differently, an incentive—a device “to 
stimulate, to encourage, or to induce”—provides a spur where none 
existed before or where the existing one was insufficient to generate 
the desired behavior. 
Thus, the third question that the courts and Congress should ask 
about any given piece of IP legislation is whether it is reasonable to 
believe that the encouragement the law will provide either to the 
increase or the dissemination of knowledge will be an improvement 
over the encouragement provided by existing laws. 
These three questions provide Congress and the courts with a 
framework for analyzing the constitutionality of IP enactments under 
the IP Clause. The next Part suggests how the framework might be 
put into use. 
III.  LIMITING THE DAMAGE: A JUDICIAL SOLUTION? 
There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the problems outlined in 
this Note. Righting the direction of IP policy in the United States will 
require concerted efforts by both the legislature and the judiciary. 
That cooperation is, concededly, unlikely. Still, either branch acting 
alone could make significant inroads against overreaching IP 
enactments, as this Part will show. 
Congress has a wide variety of potential solutions at its fingertips 
should it decide to comply with the constitutional mandate that it 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” in its IP 
enactments.116 One relatively simple solution would be to amend the 
Copyright and Patent Acts with a mandate that courts limit their 
 
 116. E.g., Freedom and Innovation Revitalizing U.S. Entrepreneurship Act of 2007 (FAIR 
USE), H.R. 1201, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposing to strengthen fair use and restore common-
sense consumer rights to make use of copies of the copyrighted works that they have 
purchased); Benefit Authors Without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations 
(BALANCE) Act of 2005, H.R. 4536, 109th Cong. (2005) (same). 
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enforcement of those acts to cases that promote progress.117 Another, 
more adventurous—and therefore less likely—solution would be to 
embed sunset provisions in new copyright legislation, describing 
Congress’s belief that the legislation will promote progress but 
invalidating the law if certain empirical targets—for example, 
measuring the growth of research or writings in specified areas of 
scholarship or literature—are not met.118 
The courts, for their part, should respond to laws that overreach 
Congress’s power with two measures. First, they should reject any 
further expansions of copyright law that cannot be shown to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Second, they 
should limit the application of current copyright laws by reading in a 
requirement that any application of a copyright or patent statute 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” An ideal solution 
would involve findings of as-applied or even facial unconstitutionality 
for some of the most recent copyright-related enactments. Such 
holdings, however, would buck precedent—including Eldred—and 
therefore lower courts’ hands are effectively tied. 
A.  A Fifth Fair-Use Factor: Balancing Progress-Promoting Values 
This is not to say, however, that courts’ quivers are empty when 
they see parties urging applications of copyright or copyright-related 
laws that are progress-retarding or progress-neutral. Courts may rule 
that an alleged infringer whose use is more progress-promoting than 
the allegedly infringed copyright is instead making a fair use of the 
copyrighted material. 
Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act states that “the fair use of 
a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”119 Hence, 
a person making a fair use of a copyright holder’s work is not liable to 
that copyright holder.120 Section 107 does not offer a definition of fair 
use; instead, it provides two sets of tools to guide the court in its 
analysis of whether an otherwise infringing use should be considered 
 
 117. Compare supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text, describing the internal limitations 
placed on the federal kidnapping statute by Congress in an attempt to remain within its 
Commerce Clause power. 
 118. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006) (providing that the Librarian of Congress may 
grant three-year exemptions from the strictures of the anticircumvention provisions of the 
DMCA to certain classes of copyrighted works, subject to a five-factor determination including 
several empirical or quasi-empirical findings). 
 119. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 120. See id. 
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noninfringing. The first tool is a nonexclusive121 list of “purposes” to 
which a fair use might be put: “criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research.”122 This list does little work beyond putting courts on notice 
concerning the kinds of uses that might be (but sometimes are not123) 
fair. 
The second tool is a nonexclusive124 list of four factors that courts 
must consider “in determining whether the use . . . is a fair use”:125 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself 
bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of 
all the above factors.126 
The fair-use doctrine has aptly been described as “the duct tape 
of the copyright system,”127 in part because it offers courts a remedy 
for situations in which the literal application of a copyright law would 
lead to an absurd or undesirable result.128 Pressing fair use into service 
 
 121. Id. (suggesting that certain uses are noninfringing when they are “for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship or research”). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir. 
1996) (holding that § 107 “does not provide blanket immunity for ‘multiple copies for classroom 
use’”). 
 124. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (stating that 
“[t]he factors enumerated in the section are not meant to be exclusive” but are “especially 
relevant”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[T]he factors to be considered shall include [the four 
factors].”). 
 125. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 126. Id. § 107(1)–(4). 
 127. BOYLE, supra note 23, at 120. 
 128. E.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451–55 (1983) 
(holding that unauthorized time-shifting of copyrighted telecasts using a videocassette 
recorder—though it is technically a violation of a copyright owner’s § 106 rights—is a fair use, 
because it is noncommercial and causes little or no harm). Whenever a scholar, critic, or student 
quotes another work, he would—but for the fair use defense—risk copyright liability, because 
quotation is a “reproduc[tion of] the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). Fair use also 
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to ensure that copyright promotes progress is not a new idea;129 
indeed, as the Supreme Court held in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc.,130 the doctrine’s goal is to “fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”131 Courts are 
admonished to “avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, 
on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is 
designed to foster.”132 Instead, courts must weigh the enumerated 
factors “in light of the purposes of copyright.”133 Neither Acuff-Rose 
nor previous scholarship in this direction, however, has provided the 
courts with sufficient guidance in balancing the relevant concerns.134 
Judges should therefore apply a fifth fair-use factor, making 
explicit the weighing of the progress-promoting clause with respect to 
the work of each of the parties. Thus, in addition to the other four 
factors, courts should consider the effect of the alleged infringer’s use 
on the promotion of the progress of science and useful arts, and 
whether that use better serves the progress-promoting purpose than 
does enforcement of the copyright holder’s rights over the 
copyrighted work. To determine the relative levels of progress 
promotion, courts should look at each use with the three questions 
from Part II.A in mind. 
In conducting this analysis, courts should balance the use of the 
work against the progress-promoting value of enforcing the copyright 
holder’s rights, rather than simply looking at the progress-promoting 
value—if any—of the work itself. Two uses of the same work might 
have different progress-promoting values. For example, verbatim 
copying for one’s own personal use is less likely to promote progress 
 
generally protects the professor who hands out in-class photocopies for her students. Id. § 107 
(“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in 
copies . . . for . . . teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use) . . . is not an 
infringement of copyright.”). But see Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1393 (rejecting 
defendants’ fair use defense of the creation of “coursepacks,” which contained photocopies of 
professor-selected readings for use by those professors’ students). 
 129. See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of 
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1839–40 
(2006) (“In certain cases it would be desirable, and indeed natural, to ask whether the examined 
use promotes the progress of knowledge or not.”). 
 130. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 131. Id. at 575 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 132. Id. at 577 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)). 
 133. Id. at 578. 
 134. See Oliar, supra note 129, at 1839–40 (suggesting that the Ninth Circuit could have 
“recognize[d] the constitutional purpose of the copyright system as a fifth relevant fair use 
factor” in deciding Kelly v. Arriba, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
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than is the creation of a derivative work. In making that assessment, 
courts need not determine whether the work being copied makes a 
significant advancement of human knowledge. 
There are two situations in which a court could find that this fifth 
fair-use factor favors the alleged infringer. In the first situation, 
enforcement of the copyright holder’s rights is progress retarding or 
progress neutral, and the alleged infringer’s use is progress 
promoting. In such a situation,135 this proposed new factor should be 
tied to a strong presumption that the alleged infringer’s use is fair, a 
presumption rebuttable only by a finding that all four of the other 
factors weigh against fair use. The addition of a presumption to the 
fair-use weighing test is within the bounds of accepted fair-use 
analysis: in 1983, the Supreme Court effectively added a presumption 
to the first fair-use factor with its statement that “every commercial 
use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of 
the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright.”136 
Moreover, if Congress’s power extends only to progress-promoting 
enactments, the addition of this presumption to the fair-use-factor 
analysis would help ensure that the application of copyright law hews 
to constitutional limitations, even if the law itself does not. 
The second situation in which a court might find that the new 
factor favors the alleged infringer is when the copyright holder’s use 
is progress promoting, but the alleged infringer’s use is clearly more 
so.137 Because the underlying copyright is progress promoting—thus 
satisfying the constitutional requirements for copyright and therefore 
making the use a fit subject for congressional legislation—the 
proposed new factor should be treated as equal in weight to the other 
four, with no presumption tied to it. This reduction in significance 
balances the consideration that the progress-promoting clause 
contains no requirement that Congress promote progress by the best 
means available against the consideration that a court should accord 
some weight to a use’s more efficient or effective promotion of 
progress. 
Although finding fair use where the alleged infringer’s use 
promotes progress to a greater extent than the enforcement of the 
copyright holder’s copyright is perhaps the most helpful of an unlikely 
range of judicial solutions, it is by no means a perfect one. One major 
 
 135. See infra Part III.C. 
 136. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1983). 
 137. See infra Part III.C. 
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difficulty from the perspective of an alleged infringer hoping to rely 
on fair use—and especially on an expanded conception of fair use—is 
that, procedurally, fair use is often raised at trial as the only viable 
defense to what is otherwise clear infringement.138 Thus, the alleged 
infringer labors under the threat of litigation, and uncertainty about 
her rights as against those of the copyright holder may cause her to 
avoid making use of the work at all—even if her intended use would, 
in all probability, be ruled a fair one. 
Another challenge is that the question of what promotes 
progress is by its nature a difficult determination.139 Indeed, this is 
likely one reason why the courts have hitherto been squeamish about 
enforcing the progress-promoting clause as a substantive limitation on 
Congress’s power. This Note has argued that there is a principled 
means for making that determination; however, the burden of doing 
so might more fairly be placed on an appellate court reviewing the 
constitutionality of a piece of legislation than on a trial court 
adjudicating a dispute over whether a given use is fair. A third, and 
related, problem is the potential increase in both the frequency and 
difficulty of litigation, further straining the courts’ already-strained 
dockets and budgets. 
One response to these last two difficulties is that the explicit 
review of progress promotion is only a short step from the analysis 
that courts are supposed to perform in every fair-use determination 
under current precedent. Courts are to explore all four of the 
statutory factors and “weigh[ them] together[] in light of the purposes 
of copyright.”140 If the Acuff-Rose Court intended for that directive to 
have some substantive effect, then the fair-use reviewing court must 
already consider to some extent the progress-promoting values of 
both the allegedly infringing use and the underlying copyright. 
B.  Promoting Progress in the Aggregate 
Applying this fifth fair-use factor would allow attorneys 
representing alleged infringers to argue that, in the aggregate, 
individual acts of what would otherwise be copyright infringement 
 
 138. See, e.g., Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 574 (“It is uncontested here that 2 Live Crew’s song 
would be an infringement of Acuff-Rose’s rights in ‘Oh, Pretty Woman’ under the Copyright 
Act of 1976, but for a finding of fair use through parody.” (citation omitted)). 
 139. See supra Part II. 
 140. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 578. 
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can promote progress better than can the enforcement, against all 
alleged infringers, of the underlying copyright. 
In the 1942 Commerce Clause case Wickard v. Filburn,141 the 
Supreme Court held that Congress could legislate in a manner that 
reached individual farmers’ use of their own wheat, despite its purely 
intrastate nature.142 Key to this determination was the finding that 
although “appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may 
be trivial by itself[, that] is not enough to remove him from the scope 
of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together 
with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”143 
Just as individual, intrastate acts can have a judicially and 
congressionally cognizable negative effect on interstate commerce, 
individual acts of alleged copyright infringement can have a judicially 
cognizable positive effect on progress.144 The collective action of, for 
example, a million individuals adopting a disruptive new technology 
(be it the VCR or peer-to-peer file-sharing software) places pressure 
on the industries involved to adapt and innovate145—the kind of 
“Progress” the Framers thought Congress should promote. In such 
situations, and especially when faced with an enactment that has been 
shown to be contrary to innovation in some of its applications, a judge 
reviewing the individual adopter’s case should consider a finding of 
fair use. 
One objection to this proposal is that it costs copyright holders 
profits. For example, the RIAA has alleged billions of dollars in 
 
 141. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 142. Id. at 125 (“[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as 
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial 
economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what 
might at some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’”). 
 143. Id. at 127–28; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (“When Congress 
decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a threat to the national market, it may 
regulate the entire class.” (citation omitted)). 
 144. This argument, although similar to that in Wickard, is perhaps better viewed as its 
mirror image. In Wickard, the individual’s activity, when considered in a collective context, 
placed him within the bounds of Congress’s affirmative constitutional reach. Wickard, 317 U.S. 
at 127–28. Here, by contrast, the individual’s activity, when considered in a collective context, 
may place him outside the enforceable bounds of a congressional enactment. 
 145. See PATRY, supra note 5, at 4 (“History has proved repeatedly that there is no genuine 
choice when businesses are faced with a new product that gives consumers what they want. 
Failure to adapt is fatal even to well-managed market leaders that stay in close touch with their 
customers.”). 
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losses due to peer-to-peer file sharing.146 The courts must remember 
that activities that limit profits may retard progress, but the one does 
not imply the other. The RIAA’s losses, even if proved, are not 
directly relevant to the question of progress promotion. Peer-to-peer 
file sharing has promoted progress both by directly increasing the 
dissemination of knowledge147 and by advancing the technical means 
by which knowledge can be disseminated through the impetus to 
create ever more efficient and decentralized networks. The loss of 
recording-industry profits would be relevant to the question of 
progress promotion only insofar as that loss has generated a decline 
in the amount or quality of music being produced. So long as the 
income still being generated is sufficient to create incentives for new 
work, the constitutional requirement of progress promotion is 
satisfied. 
C.  Effects of Expanding Fair Use 
Addition of this fifth fair-use factor would have a destabilizing 
effect on many existing copyrights. But because the fair-use analysis is 
dependent on individualized determinations, the effect will 
necessarily be restricted to those situations in which courts find uses 
to be fair. 
One area in which the proposed fifth factor would make a 
significant difference is in the use of orphan works. An orphan work 
is a work that is presumptively under copyright, but for which no 
copyright holder is known or can be located.148 The problem of 
orphan works results from a combination of automatic copyright 
protection with ever-lengthening copyright terms that extend well 
beyond an author’s lifespan.149 Under previous incarnations of the 
Copyright Act, many of these works would be in the public domain, 
either because their terms had expired or because the original author 
did not register the copyright and therefore did not receive copyright 
 
 146. Piracy: On-line and On the Street, RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2011). 
 147. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
 148. Notice of Inquiry, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, 3739 (Jan. 26, 2005) (defining “orphan works” as 
“copyrighted works whose owners are difficult or even impossible to locate”). 
 149. See id. at 3740 (“The legislative history to the 1976 [Copyright] Act reflects Congress’ 
recognition of the concern raised by some that eliminating renewal requirements would take a 
large number of works out of the public domain and that for a number of those older works it 
might be difficult or impossible to identify the copyright owner in order to obtain 
permissions.”). 
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protection. Under the 1978 Act—which grants automatic protection 
upon the work’s fixation and which, as amended, now protects the 
work for the life of the author plus seventy years—it is likely that a 
work created in the second half of the twentieth century will not enter 
the public domain until the end of the twenty-first.150 Orphan works—
those that have fallen through the cracks—cannot legally be 
reproduced, because to do so without authorization is a violation of 
the author’s rights under § 106 of the Copyright Act.151 And because 
the works are orphaned, no author can be petitioned for a license or 
other permission to reproduce the work. These works represent a rich 
vein of culture that might provide education and entertainment to a 
new audience, or that artists and authors could mine for use in their 
own derivative works. 
Any use of an otherwise-unused orphan work—either its direct 
reproduction for distribution or its use in a derivative work—is likely 
to promote both the advancement and the spread of knowledge to a 
significantly greater degree than the protection of an unknown 
author’s right to prevent reproduction. Indeed, orphan works 
languish in archives and on bookshelves, often stored in deteriorating 
media.152 
Imagine that a publishing house comes into possession of an 
anonymous, unpublished novel of great cultural significance, written 
at some point in the 1960s. The publishing house could publish the 
book, gambling that the original owner is unlikely to step forward at 
this late date.153 But, under the law as it currently exists, if the author 
 
 150. A work created in 1960 by an author who was twenty-five at the time and who dies at 
age eighty (in 2015) will not enter the public domain until 2085—assuming no further extensions 
of the copyright term. Given the recent history of congressional practice in this area, that is 
probably not a safe assumption to make. 
 151. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006) (“[T]he owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive right[] . . . to 
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . . .”). 
 152. E.g., Pamela Brannon, Note, Reforming Copyright to Foster Innovation: Providing 
Access to Orphaned Works, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 145, 146 (2006) (describing the problems 
faced by the owner of a collection of copyrighted Apple II software, which is stored on magnetic 
media that have become unreadable). 
 153. This is, in fact, quite similar to the task undertaken by the Google Books project, 
Google’s attempt to digitize all printed material and render it searchable. The Authors’ Guild 
sued Google. Complaint, Authors Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
20, 2005), available at http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/settlement-resources.
attachment/authors-guild-v-google/Authors Guild v Google 09202005.pdf. After several years of 
legal wrangling, Google and the Authors’ Guild, along with the Association of American 
Publishers, announced a settlement under which Google would pay $125 million in exchange for 
certain use licenses, including those regarding orphan works. Stephanie Condon, Google 
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did then step forward, the publisher could be on the hook for millions 
of dollars in statutory damages—a calculus no corporate attorney is 
likely to approve. Under current law, the use made by the publisher 
would almost certainly not be considered fair because the first three 
fair-use factors weigh heavily against a finding of fair use.154 
In this situation, however, a reviewing court would almost 
certainly find that the proposed fifth factor weighs in favor of a 
finding of fair use, because enforcement of the copyright holder’s 
copyright—as against the publisher155—would likely be progress-
retarding, or at best progress-neutral. This finding would raise a 
presumption that the use was fair. And under this Note’s proposed 
framework, even a finding that the first three factors hewed against 
finding the use fair would still be insufficient to overcome the fair-use 
presumption, because the fourth factor—“the effect of the use upon 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”156—would, 
at worst, be a wash, and would more likely fall in favor of a finding of 
fair use. Almost by definition, there is no market for an orphan work, 
because without the authorization of the absent author, the work 
cannot be reproduced for sale. The actions of the publisher thus do 
not harm the market for the work; rather, they create the market. 
This leads to another useful effect of the proposed fifth factor. 
The fourth factor often leads to circular reasoning, because to assess 
the effect of an alleged infringer’s use on the market for a copyrighted 
work, a court must assume a market for licenses for the alleged 
infringer’s use. Such a market will exist only if a court does not find 
that the use was fair.157 Because the fourth factor is often dispositive, 
 
Reaches $125 Million Settlement with Authors, CNET (Oct. 28, 2008, 7:49 AM PDT), http://
news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10076948-38.html. Under this Note’s proposed framework, 
digitizing orphan works and making them available to the public would be a presumptively fair 
use. 
 154. The use would be commercial, the work—a novel—would be one that traditionally 
receives “thick” copyright protection, and the novel’s publication would of necessity require the 
use of all of the original work. 
 155. Once the book has seen publication and a previously unknown author has stepped 
forward to challenge the publisher’s use of his work, the scales would likely tip back in favor of 
enforcing the author’s rights to the work. Compensating the author for further editions of his 
work—beyond the publisher’s first publication—would provide an incentive for the author to 
create further works. Note that the effect of this incentive is lessened considerably if it is not the 
author but his heir who steps forward to claim the windfall. 
 156. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006). 
 157. Because a fair use is not an infringement, an author has no legally protectable interest 
in preventing it and therefore cannot reasonably expect to charge money for that use. See 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (noting, in a fair use case, that “the 
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allowing its determination to turn on circular, self-fulfilling reasoning 
guts the fair-use doctrine.158 The new progress-weighing factor would 
restore balance by providing the courts with objective guidance: the 
question of whether a use promotes the advancement and 
dissemination of knowledge is one that is susceptible of empirical 
proof.159 
This expansion of the fair-use doctrine through judges’ inclusion 
of a fifth fair-use factor weighing progress-promoting values would 
help place copyright law back on course. Although its effects would 
destabilize some copyright holders’ rights in their copyrighted works, 
that destabilization would extend primarily to situations in which the 
copyright holder’s use was ineffective in advancing or disseminating 
knowledge.160 And in those cases, it seems unobjectionable for the 
courts to assist Congress in ensuring that its laws do not flout the 
Constitution.161 
CONCLUSION 
One may hope that copyright’s swallowing of the public domain 
cannot get much worse—that IP protections are approaching a nadir 
beyond which policymakers will realize the folly of their ways and 
start steering the ship of American copyright policy away from the 
shark-infested shoals of ever-increasing IP protection. When we find 
 
unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their 
own productions removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market”). 
 158. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 620 (2008) (“Ultimately, the paradox of the fourth factor is that it 
is everything in the fair use test and thus nothing.”). 
 159. See generally Comm’n of the European Communities, First Evaluation of Directive 
96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases (Dec. 12, 2005) (unpublished working paper), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.
pdf (providing empirical evidence that the European Union’s adoption of a sui generis database 
protection right, akin to copyright, had a negative effect on the growth of Europe’s database 
industry). For related discussion, see supra Part II.A. 
 160. To the extent that the destabilization would extend beyond these holders’ uses, it 
would create pressure on all copyright holders to ensure that the uses being made of their works 
promote progress. To the extent that authors maintain ownership of their copyrights, this, 
concededly, might have the effect of channeling authorial resources away from the creation of 
new works. But in a regime in which authorship is often divorced from copyright ownership, it 
seems likely that the general progress-promoting pressure would outweigh any tangential 
progress-retarding effects. 
 161. See U.S. CONST. art VI (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned . . . and 
all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be 
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . . .”). 
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ourselves in a world in which IP laws increasingly serve not to 
promote progress but rather to retard it, policymakers’ response must 
not be to rely on the vain hope that steering the present course—
increasing the strength, reach, and duration of those laws—will solve 
the problem. 
This Note is an attempt to provide one more navigational aid in 
the ever-growing panoply of scholarly opinion concerning copyright’s 
excesses. Courts considering copyright-infringement cases could place 
substantive limits on copyright holders’ monopolies on their works by 
finding fair use when it appears that others’ use of those works better 
effectuates the constitutional mandate of the IP Clause. 
It may not yet be too late to avoid a world in which advances in 
knowledge, literature, and art can come only after an investment of 
time and resources in discovering and licensing prior copyrighted 
work. We could instead return to a world with a rich, vibrant, and—
most importantly—growing public domain upon which authors and 
artists can draw to “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.”162 
 
 162. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
